ained strength in
England in the last century, he is obviously looking at the formulae
and not at the social body behind.

This leads to considerations really more important than the
argumentation about _a priori_ and inductive methods. Mill in practice
knew very well the qualifications necessary before his principles
applied. He showed it in his Indian evidence; and Place could have
told him, had it required telling, that the actual political machinery
worked by very strange and tortuous methods. Yet he was content to
override such considerations when he is expounding his theory, and
laid himself open to Macaulay's broad common-sense retort. The nation
at large cannot, he says, have a 'sinister interest.' It must desire
legislation which is beneficial to the whole. This is to make the vast
assumption that every individual will desire what is good for all, and
will be a sufficient judge of what is good. But is it clear that a
majority will even desire what is good for the whole? May they not
wish to sacrifice both other classes and coming generations to their
own instantaneous advantages? Is it plain that even enlightenment of
mind would induce a poor man to see his own advantage in the policy
which would in the long run be best for the whole society? You are
bound, said Macaulay, to show that the poor man will not believe that
he personally would benefit by direct plunder of the rich; and indeed
that he would not be right in so believing. The nation, no doubt,
would suffer, but in the immediate period which alone is contemplated
by a selfish pauper, the mass of the poor might get more pleasure out
of confiscation. Will they not, on your own principles, proceed to
confiscation? Shall we not have such a catastrophe as the reign of
terror?

The Westminster Reviewer retorted by saying that Macaulay prophesied a
reign of terror as a necessary consequence of an extended franchise.
Macaulay, skilfully enough, protested against this interpretation. 'We
say again and again,' he declares, 'that we are on the defensive. We
do not think it necessary to prove that a quack medicine is poison.
Let the vendor prove it to be sanative. We do not pretend to show that
universal suffrage is an evil. Let its advocates show it to be a
good.'[119] Mill rests his whole case upon the selfishness of mankind.
Will not the selfishness lead the actual majority at a given moment to
plunder the rich and to disregard the interests of their own
succ