orance, that governments admit of such
encroachments, and they are easily to be prevented, partly, as has been
shewn, by positive regulation, and partly by counteracting them,
whenever they appear to be proceeding in a direction any way
doubtful. When they do so, the conclusion may be, that they are
working for themselves; and, in that case, they ought to be very
minutely examined into; and, as all public bodies, and men belonging
to a class that has a particular interest generally derive their means of
trenching on the public from government, it may very easily controul
their action, or counteract the effect.

As lawyers have the administration of justice amongst themselves; as
the executive part is in their hand, the law-makers should be
particularly careful to make them amenable by law for bad conduct; it
ought not to be left in the bosom of a court, to strike off, or keep on,
an improper man. It is not right, on the one hand, that attorneys, or any
set of men, should be subject to an arbitrary exertion of power; and it
is equally unfair for them to be protected, by having those who are to
judge between them and the public, always belonging to their own
body. In defence of this, it is said, that attornies are servants of the
court, and that the business of the court being to do justice, their
correction cannot be in better hands. This is a tolerably ingenious
assertion, if it were strictly true; but the court consists both of judge
and jury; whereas, in this case, the judge assumes all the power; that is
to say, when a case is to be determined relative to the conduct of a
lawyer, a lawyer is to be the sole judge, and the jury, who represent
the public, are to have their power set aside; thus, when their opinion
is most wanted, it is not allowed to be given. Under such regulation,
what real redress can be expected? As for the taxing costs by a master,
it is [end of page #279] rarely that a client, from prudential motives,
dares appeal; and, when he does, the remedy is frequently worse than
the disease; and, even in this case a lawyer judges a lawyer. Without
saying any thing against the judgments, it will be allowed, that in
neither case is the principle of Magna Carta adhered to, of a man
being judged by his peers; besides, in every other fraud there is
punishment proportioned to the crime. In this case there is no
punishment, unless the extortion is exorbitant, and then the
punishment is too great. It ought to be pr