e opposition in pursuance of such
combination. This, in substance, has been the interpretation
given to these words by the English Judges, and it has been
uniformly and fully recognized and adopted in the Courts of the
United States. (See Foster, Hale, and Hawkins, and the opinions
of Iredell, Patterson, Chase, Marshall, and Washington, J.J., of
the Supreme Court, and of Peters, D.J., in U.S. vs. Vijol, U.S.
vs. Mitchell, U.S. vs. Fries, U.S. vs. Bollman and Swartwout,
and U.S. vs. Burr).

The definition, as you will observe, includes two particulars,
both of them indispensable elements of the offence. There must
have been a combination or conspiring together to oppose the law
by force, and some actual force must have been exerted, or the
crime of treason is not consummated. The highest, or at least
the direct proof of the combination may be found in the declared
purposes of the individual party before the actual outbreak; or
it may be derived from the proceedings of meetings, in which he
took part openly; or which he either prompted, or made effective
by his countenance or sanction,--commending, counselling and
instigating forcible resistance to the law. I speak, of course,
of a conspiring to resist a law, not the more limited purpose to
violate it, or to prevent its application and enforcement in a
particular case, or against a particular individual. The
combination must be directed against the law itself. But such
direct proof of this element of the offence is not legally
necessary to establish its existence. The concert of purpose may
be deduced from the concerted action itself, or it may be
inferred from facts occurring at the time, or afterwards, as
well as before. Besides this, there must be some act of
violence, as the result or consequence of the combining.

But here again, it is not necessary to prove that the individual
accused was a direct, personal actor in the violence. If he was
present, directing, aiding, abetting, counselling, or
countenancing it, he is in law guilty of the forcible act. Nor
is even his personal presence indispensable. Though he be absent
at the time of its actual perpetration, yet, if he directed the
act, devised, or knowingly furnished the means for carrying it
into effect, instigated others to perform it, he shares their
guilt.