of fortifications; nor was the decision of battles reduced to the
quick and heavy _fire_ of a line of infantry, whom it were fruitless to
protect with armor against a similar fire of their enemies. Steel and
iron were still the common instruments of destruction and safety; and
the helmets, cuirasses, and shields, of the tenth century did not,
either in form or substance, essentially differ from those which
had covered the companions of Alexander or Achilles. But instead of
accustoming the modern Greeks, like the legionaries of old, to the
constant and easy use of this salutary weight, their armor was laid
aside in light chariots, which followed the march, till, on the
approach of an enemy, they resumed with haste and reluctance the unusual
encumbrance. Their offensive weapons consisted of swords, battle-axes,
and spears; but the Macedonian pike was shortened a fourth of its
length, and reduced to the more convenient measure of twelve cubits or
feet. The sharpness of the Scythian and Arabian arrows had been severely
felt; and the emperors lament the decay of archery as a cause of the
public misfortunes, and recommend, as an advice and a command, that the
military youth, till the age of forty, should assiduously practise
the exercise of the bow. The _bands_, or regiments, were usually three
hundred strong; and, as a medium between the extremes of four and
sixteen, the foot soldiers of Leo and Constantine were formed eight
deep; but the cavalry charged in four ranks, from the reasonable
consideration, that the weight of the front could not be increased by
any pressure of the hindmost horses. If the ranks of the infantry or
cavalry were sometimes doubled, this cautious array betrayed a secret
distrust of the courage of the troops, whose numbers might swell the
appearance of the line, but of whom only a chosen band would dare to
encounter the spears and swords of the Barbarians. The order of battle
must have varied according to the ground, the object, and the adversary;
but their ordinary disposition, in two lines and a reserve, presented a
succession of hopes and resources most agreeable to the temper as well
as the judgment of the Greeks. In case of a repulse, the first line fell
back into the intervals of the second; and the reserve, breaking into
two divisions, wheeled round the flanks to improve the victory or cover
the retreat. Whatever authority could enact was accomplished, at least
in theory, by the camps and marches,