ch fear presented many unto them,
caused the people of Rome to wait upon their consuls out of the town,
like a pensive train of mourners, thinking upon Marcellus and Crispinus,
upon whom, in the like sort, they had given attendance the last year,
but saw neither of them return alive from a less dangerous war.
Particularly old Q. Fabius gave his accustomed advice to M. Livius, that
he should abstain from giving or taking battle until he well understood
the enemy's condition. But the consul made him a froward answer, and
said that he would fight the very first day, for that he thought it long
till he should either recover his honor by victory, or, by seeing the
overthrow of his own unjust citizens, satisfy himself with the joy of a
great though not an honest revenge. But his meaning was better than his
words."

Hannibal at this period occupied with his veteran but much-reduced
forces the extreme south of Italy. It had not been expected either by
friend or foe that Hasdrubal would effect his passage of the Alps so
early in the year as actually occurred. And even when Hannibal learned
that his brother was in Italy, and had advanced as far as Placentia, he
was obliged to pause for further intelligence before he himself
commenced active operations, as he could not tell whether his brother
might not be invited into Etruria, to aid the party there that was
disaffected to Rome, or whether he would march down by the Adriatic Sea.
Hannibal led his troops out of their winter quarters in Bruttium, and
marched northward as far as Canusium. Nero had his head-quarters near
Venusia, with an army which he had increased to forty thousand foot and
two thousand five hundred horse, by incorporating under his own command
some of the legions which had been intended to act under other generals
in the South. There was another Roman army, twenty thousand strong,
south of Hannibal at Tarentum. The strength of that city secured this
Roman force from any attack by Hannibal, and it was a serious matter to
march northward and leave it in his rear, free to act against all his
depots and allies in the friendly part of Italy, which for the two or
three last campaigns had served him for a base of his operations.
Moreover, Nero's army was so strong that Hannibal could not concentrate
troops enough to assume the offensive against it without weakening his
garrisons and relinquishing, at least for a time, his grasp upon the
southern provinces. To do this befo