s she was at Ypres
after the first gas attack a year ago. The French army leaders judged
the Verdun position as not worth the cost of defending. They were
overruled by the politicians and they defended it successfully. But
their first decision is the best evidence of the wholly illusory value
that has been attached to the possession of Verdun itself.

The politicians were unquestionably right as to the moral value, and
it is possible if not probable that the relinquishment of the city
voluntarily might have precipitated the fall of the Briand Ministry
and the creation of a Committee of Public Safety--not to make peace,
but to make war successfully. The will to defend Verdun came from the
French people, it imposed itself upon the army and it resulted in a
moral victory the consequences of which cannot be exaggerated and have
given new heart and confidence to a people whose courage and
determination must make an enduring impression on any one who sees
France in the present terrible but glorious time.

IV

VERDUN, THE DOOR THAT LEADS NOWHERE

THE BATTLE AND THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD--AN ANALYSIS
OF THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE

In a preceding article I have endeavored to explain the tremendous
moral "lift" that the successful defence of the city of Verdun has
brought to France, a moral "lift" which has roused French confidence
and expectation of ultimate victory to the highest point since the war
began. I have also tried to demonstrate how utterly without value the
fortress of Verdun was, because the forts were of no use in the
present war, were as useless against German heavy artillery as those
of Antwerp and Maubeuge, and had been evacuated by the French a full
eighteen months before the present battle began. Finally I have
indicated that so little military value was attached to Verdun by the
French high command that it was prepared to evacuate the whole
position, which is the most difficult to defend on the whole French
front, and was only persuaded to give over his purpose by the
arguments of the politicians, who believed that the moral effect of
the evacuation would be disastrous to France and inspiriting to
Germany.

I now desire to describe at some length the actual topographical
circumstances of Verdun and later I shall discuss the fashion in which
an automobile transport system was improvised to meet the situation
created by the interruption of traffic by German artillery fire along
the