to see that most of the
divorces are justifiable; when they have not been, they have not been
slow to say so.

Yet again Chesterton repeats the somewhat superficial argument against
divorce that its obvious effect would be frivolous marriage. The normal
person on his or her wedding day luckily does not think about anything
beyond the supreme happiness they have found at least at the time. It is
lightly said that the modern Adam and Eve think of the chances of
divorce before marriage whatever may be the cause of divorce afterwards;
at least it will be agreed that it is a failure of a particular two
people who thought that their lives together would be a mutual
happiness. Therefore, when Chesterton says that divorce is likely to
make frivolous marriages he is saying that couples about to marry do so
expecting it to be a failure. If this be so, then the young men and
women of to-day are more hopeless than they are commonly made to appear
by correspondence about them in the papers. If, on the other hand, every
couple on marriage knew for a certainty that it was 'till death us do
part,' it is more than likely that marriage would be a thing that was
abnormal, not normal. It might even be that the Church would have to
listen to reason, and be disturbed over worse things than divorce, and
whether she should endeavour to take a Christian attitude to those who
had been unfortunate or indiscreet.

Chesterton is very concerned that the time will come when 'there will be
a distinction between those who are married and those who are really
married.' This is precisely to state what is Utopia. At present many
people who are really married are in the chains of slavery; the more who
get out of it the better. As the number of those whose marriages are a
farce will gradually diminish, thus will divorce be a godsend. Divorce
is, in certain cases, a godsend, but the priests refuse to listen to the
Divine revelation.

Chesterton sketches at some length the nature of a vow. He considers
that Henry the VIII broke the civilization of vows when he wished to
have done with his wife. It is quite possible that he did, but it is
also possible that she did precisely the same thing. The question in
regard to our inquiry is: Is the marriage vow entirely binding even when
the other party to the contract has broken it? The opponents of divorce,
amongst whom are Chesterton, will quite easily say that it is, yet they
cheerfully ignore the fact that in a