course knew better, but even they believed there was being
played a game of bluff on both sides, with this vital difference,
however--we bluffed, and, as they full well knew, did not prepare;
they bluffed, and, to an extent we never knew, did prepare. Though
therefore their generals were amateurs in the arts of modern warfare
as so many of our own proved to be, they confidently reckoned that, if
they could strike a staggering blow whilst we were as yet unready,
they would inevitably win a second Amajuba. Magnanimity would again
leave them masters of the situation, and if not, European intervention
would presently compel us to arbitrate away our claims. But Joubert's
softness, Schoeman's incompetency and Cronje's surrender spoiled the
project just when success seemed in sight. One other cause of Boer
failure which remained in force to the very last was their utter lack
of discipline. My specially frank and intelligent informant said no
Boer ever took part in a fight unless he felt so inclined. He claimed
liberty to ignore the most urgent commands of his field cornet, and
might even unreproved slap him in the face. Such decidedly independent
fighting may serve for the defence of an almost inaccessible kopje,
but an attack conducted on such lines is almost sure to fall to
pieces. It was therefore seldom attempted, but many a lawless deed
was done, like firing on ambulances and funeral parties, for which no
leader can well be held responsible.

[Sidenote: _The Surprisers Surprised._]

This light formation lent itself, however, excellently well to the
success of the guerilla type of warfare, which the Boers maintained
for more than twelve months after all their principal towns were
taken. Solitary snipers were thus able from safe distances to pick off
unsuspecting man, or horse, or ox, and, if in danger of being traced,
could hide the bandolier and pose as a peace-loving citizen seeking
his own lost ox.

In some cases small detachments of our men on convoy or outpost duty
were cut off by these ever-watchful, ever-wandering bands of Boers,
and an occasional gun or pom-pom was temporarily captured, a result
for which in one case at least extra rum rations were reputed to be
responsible. But it must be remembered that our men and officers,
regular and irregular alike, were as inexperienced as the Boers in
many of the novel duties this war devolved upon them; that the
Transvaal lends itself as scarcely any other country unde