ging the latter
town with twenty thousand men, while with sixty thousand he is
facing Bevern."

Four days after the victory, indeed, Frederick set out with
thirteen thousand men; leaving Prince Henry to maintain the line of
the Saale, and guard Saxony; while Marshal Keith was to go into
Bohemia, raise contributions there, and threaten as far as might be
the Austrian posts in that country.

Fergus, however, went with the king's army, the king having said to
the Marshal:

"Keith, lend me that young aide-de-camp of yours. I have seen how
he can be trusted to carry a despatch, at whatever risk to his
life. He is ingenious and full of devices; and he has luck, and
luck goes for a great deal.

"I like him, too. I have observed that he is always lively and
cheery, even at the end of the longest day's work. I notice too
that, even though your relation, he never becomes too familiar; and
his talk will be refreshing, when I want something to distract my
thoughts from weighty matters."

So Fergus went with the king, who could ill afford to lose Keith
from his side. With none was he more friendly and intimate and, now
that Schwerin had gone, he relied upon him more implicitly than
upon any other of his officers.

But Keith had been, for some time, unwell. He was suffering from
asthma and other ailments that rendered rapid travel painful to
him; and he would obtain more rest and ease, in Bohemia, than he
could find in the rapid journey the king intended to make.

On the fifth day of his march Frederick heard, to his stupefaction,
that Schweidnitz had surrendered. The place was an extremely strong
one, and the king had relied confidently upon its holding out for
two or three months. Its fortifications were constructed in the
best manner; it was abundantly supplied with cannon, ammunition,
and provisions; and its surrender was inexcusable.

The fault was doubtless, to a large degree, that of its commandant,
who was a man of no resolution or resources; but it was also partly
due to the fact that a portion of the garrison were Saxons, who had
at Pirna been obliged to enter the Prussian service. Great numbers
of these deserted; a hundred and eighty of them, in one day, going
over from an advanced post to the enemy. With troops like these,
there could be no assurance that any post would be firmly held--a
fact that might well shake the confidence of any commander in his
power of resistance.

The blow was none the less severe,