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utterly excluded, and many that can coexist with its supremacy only by being subjugated, as beasts of burthen; and others again, as, for instance, the social tendernesses and affections, and the faculties and excitations of the intellect, which must be at least subordinated. The preservation of our loyalty and fealty under these trials and against these rivals constitutes the second sense of Faith; and we shall need but one more point of view to complete its full import. This is the consideration of what is presupposed in the human conscience. The answer is ready. As in the equation of the correlative I and Thou, one of the twin constituents is to be taken as 'plus' will, the other as 'minus' will, so is it here: and it is obvious that the reason or 'super'-individual of each man, whereby he is man, is the factor we are to take as 'minus' will; and that the individual will or personalizing principle of free agency (arbitrement is Milton's word) is the factor marked 'plus' will;--and again, that as the identity or coinherence of the absolute will and the reason, is the peculiar character of God; so is the 'synthesis' of the individual will and the common reason, by the subordination of the former to the latter, the only possible likeness or image of the 'prothesis', or identity, and therefore the required proper character of man. Conscience, then, is a witness respecting the identity of the will and the reason effected by the self-subordination of the will, or self, to the reason, as equal to, or representing, the will of God. But the personal will is a factor in other moral 'syntheses'; for example, appetite 'plus' personal will=sensuality; lust of power, 'plus' personal will,=ambition, and so on, equally as in the 'synthesis', on which the conscience is grounded. Not this therefore, but the other 'synthesis', must supply the specific character of the conscience; and we must enter into an analysis of reason. Such as the nature and objects of the reason are, such must be the functions and objects of the conscience. And the former we shall best learn by recapitulating those constituents of the total man which are either contrary to, or disparate from, the reason. I. Reason, and the proper objects of reason, are wholly alien from sensation. Reason is supersensual, and its antagonist is appetite, and the objects of appetite the lust of the flesh. II. Reason and its objects do not appertain to the wor
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