]; New
Democracy or ND [Dusan MIHAJLOVIC]; Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians
or SVM

Political pressure groups and leaders: NA

Diplomatic representation in the US: the US and Serbia and Montenegro
do not maintain full diplomatic relations; the Embassy of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continues to function in the
US
chief of mission : Ambassador (vacant); Counselor, Charge d'Affaires
ad interim Nebojsa VUJOVIC
chancery: 2410 California St. NW, Washington, DC 20008
telephone: [1] (202) 462-6566

Diplomatic representation from the US: the US and Serbia and
Montenegro do not maintain full diplomatic relations
chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Chief of Mission Richard M.
MILES
embassy: Kneza Milosa 50, 11000 Belgrade
mailing address : American Embassy, Belgrade, United States Department
of State, Washington, DC 20521-5070
telephone: [381] (11) 645655
FAX: [381] (11) 645332

Economy

Economy - overview: The swift collapse of the Yugoslav federation in
1991 has been followed by highly destructive warfare, the
destabilization of republic boundaries, and the breakup of important
interrepublic trade flows. Output in Serbia and Montenegro dropped by
half in 1992-93. Like the other former Yugoslav republics, it had
depended on its sister republics for large amounts of energy and
manufactures. Wide differences in climate, mineral resources, and
levels of technology among the republics accentuated this
interdependence, as did the communist practice of concentrating much
industrial output in a small number of giant plants. The breakup of
many of the trade links, the sharp drop in output as industrial plants
lost suppliers and markets, and the destruction of physical assets in
the fighting all have contributed to the economic difficulties of the
republics. One singular factor in the economic situation of Serbia and
Montenegro is the continuation in office of a communist government
that is primarily interested in political and military mastery, not
economic reform. Hyperinflation ended with the establishment of a new
currency unit in June 1993; prices were relatively stable in 1995.
Reliable statistics are hard to come by; the GDP estimate is extremely
rough. The economic boom anticipated by the government after the
suspension of UN sanctions in December 1995 failed to materialize in
1996 and early 1997, exacerbating the regime's financial problems.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $21 billion (199