eliefs, is the object with which the applied science of
religion, when it has been constituted by the action of Hartford
Theological Seminary, will address itself.
Now, it may seem from the practical point of view of the missionary
that with regard to fetichism there can be no question as to what its
value is or as to what his attitude should be towards it. But, even if
we should ultimately find that fetichism is obstructive to religion, we
shall still want to know what hints we can extract from the science of
religion as to the best way of cutting at the roots of fetichism; and
therefore it will be necessary to consider what exactly fetichism is.
And, as a matter of fact, there is a tendency manifesting itself
amongst students of the science of religion to say, as Dr. Haddon says
(_Magic and Fetichism_, p. 91), that "fetichism is a stage of religious
development"; and amongst writers on the philosophy of religion to take
fetichism and treat it, provisionally at any rate, if not as the
primitive religion of mankind, then as that form of religion which "we
find amongst men at the lowest stage of development known to us"
(Hoeffding, _Philosophy of Religion_, E. T., Secs. 45, 46). If, then,
fetichism is the primitive religion of {107} mankind or a stage of
religious development, "a basis from which many other modes of
religious thought have been developed" (Haddon, p. 91), it will have a
value which the missionary must recognise. And in any case he must
know what value, if any, it has.
Now, if we are, I will not say to do justice to the view that fetichism
is the primitive religion of mankind or a stage from which other modes
of religious thought have been developed, but if we are simply to
understand it, we must clearly distinguish it from the view--somewhat
paradoxical to say the least--that fetichism has no religious value,
and yet is the source of all religious values. The inference which may
legitimately be drawn from this second view is that all forms of
religious thought, having been evolved from this primitive religion of
mankind, have precisely the same value as it has; they do but make
explicit what it really was; the history of religion does but write
large and set out at length what was contained in it from the first; in
fetichism we see what from the first religion was, and what at the last
religion is. On this view, the source from which all religious values
spring is fetichism; fetichism has no value
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