the gradual
progress of the reactionary movement which ensued from them.

Four causes are usually assigned. The first of them was the introduction
of new systems of speculative philosophy.

It is not unusual, in those who have no taste for speculation, and who
understand only the prosaic, though in some respects the truer, philosophy
of Scotland, to despise the great systems of German speculation. Yet, if
the series be measured as an example of the power of the human mind,
whatever may be the opinion formed in respect to its correctness, it
stands among the most interesting efforts of thought. Though the writers
can be matched by isolated examples in former ages, perhaps no series of
writers exists, hardly even the Greek, certainly not the Neo-Platonist nor
the Cartesian, which, in far-reaching penetration, in minuteness of
analysis, in brilliancy of imagination, in loftiness of genius, in poetry
of expression, in grasp of intellect, in influence on every branch of
thought or life, approximates to the series of illustrious thinkers which
commenced with Kant and ended with Hegel.(731) The two philosophers at
this time whose teaching formed a new influence, were Fichte(732) and
Jacobi.(733) Details in reference to their systems must be sought
elsewhere.(734) It is only possible here to indicate their central
thought, in order to notice their effects on theological inquiry.

We have seen that Kant had reconsidered the great problem, commenced by
Descartes and Locke, concerning the ground of certitude, and the nature of
knowledge; and had revolutionised philosophy, by attributing to the
natural structure of the mind many of those ideas which had usually been
supposed to be derived from experience. In his system he had left two
elements, a formal and a material; the formal, or innate forms, through
which the mind gains knowledge, and the material, presented from external
sources. It was the former or ideal element which was examined by Fichte;
the latter by Jacobi.

Fichte began to teach at Jena soon after 1790. Grasping firmly Descartes'
principle, "Cogito, ergo sum," he conceived that, as we can only know
ourselves, there is no proof that the datum supposed to be external is
anything but a form of our own consciousness; and thus he arrived at a
subjective idealism not unlike that of bishop Berkeley.(735) Under his
view God was only an idea or form of thought; a regulative principle of
human belief, the moral order of w