tt; and though the title of prime
minister had come into use by 1760, it was still regarded as invidious
by constitutional purists. According to George's system he was himself
to be the only element of coherence in a ministry; it was to be formed
by the prime minister in accordance with his instructions, and each
member of it was to be guided by his will. The factious spirit of the
whigs, the extent to which they monopolised power, and the humiliating
position to which they had reduced the crown, afford a measure of
defence for his scheme of government. Yet it was in itself
unconstitutional, for it would have made the ministers who were
responsible to parliament mere agents of the king who was not personally
responsible for his public acts. And it was not, nor indeed could it be,
carried out except by adopting means which were unconstitutional and
disastrous. It necessarily made the king the head of a party. He needed
votes in parliament, and he obtained them, as the whig leaders had done,
by discreditable means. If his ministers did not please him he sought
support from the members of his party, "the king's friends," as they
were called; and so there arose an influence behind the throne distinct
from and often opposed to that of his responsible advisers.

[Sidenote: _THE KING'S SCHEME._]

Since 1757 the strife of the whig factions had been stilled by
coalition. At the king's accession the administration was strong. It
owed its strength to the co-operation of the Duke of Newcastle, the
first lord of the treasury, and Pitt, secretary of state.[10] Newcastle,
the most prominent figure among the great whig nobles, derived his power
from influence; he had an unrivalled experience in party management and
as a dispenser of patronage, and though personally above accepting a
bribe of any kind, he was an adept at corrupt practices. He would have
been incapable of conducting the war, for he was ignorant, timid, and
vacillating, but he knew how to gain the support of parliament and how
to find the supplies which the war demanded. Pitt was strong in the
popular favour which he had gained by his management of the war; he was
supremely fitted to guide the country in time of war, but he was too
haughty and imperious to be successful in the management of a party. He
did not care to concern himself about applications for bishoprics,
excisorships, titles, and pensions, or the purchase of seats in
parliament. All such work was done by Ne