d commented upon, and treated as valuable evidence. We
lost our heads for the moment; there is no doubt of that; but people who
are thus betrayed into panic will not be appeased until they have made a
scapegoat of someone. Lord Methuen was, of course, the obvious
sacrifice. Why did he make a frontal attack? Why did he fail?

It is well to remember that Lord Methuen was being pressed to relieve
Kimberley, which represented its case as extreme. He must do something.
Naturally he designed the kind of attack which the forces at his
disposal were best suited to deliver. A long turning movement was out of
the question since he had not the mounted men for it. As for the
"frontal attack" at Magersfontein, of which we have heard so much, Lord
Methuen never designed and did not deliver a direct frontal attack. His
plan was to surprise the extreme left of Cronje's position, and at the
same time contain the whole of his front with a strong force. And no
competent critic has ventured to suggest any better disposal of the
forces then available for the purposes of attack. No, Lord Methuen has
not been criticised and abused because he used his force in one way
rather than in another, but simply because he failed.

There is very often more to be learned from a failure than a success,
and this particular failure is worthy of a little study. Everyone knows
that the reason why the attack on Magersfontein failed was, first,
because the Highland Brigade lost its way and came unexpectedly into
contact with the enemy's position, and, secondly, because they failed to
rally after the first confusion, when (in the opinion of many experts
who were present) a little confidence would probably have saved the day.
If any single precaution was neglected, if any pains were spared in the
reconnoitring of the position or in securing the proper conduct of the
troops towards the place from which their attack was to be delivered,
then Lord Methuen was absolutely to blame. But the more that is known
about this unfortunate affair the more clearly it will be seen that Lord
Methuen neglected no precaution and spared no pains. The rain and pitch
darkness were the act of God, and no general in the world can prevail
when Nature is so completely in league with the enemy as she was on the
night of Magersfontein.

I do not care to dwell on the malice and cruel unfairness of many of the
attacks on Lord Methuen, because, for my country's sake, I hope they
will soon be