a reputation for
himself in Washington's camp as a military authority, and enjoyed the
full confidence of the commander-in-chief, despite certain
eccentricities of manner and an over-confidence in his own judgment
and experience. The defects and weaknesses of his character, which
eventually brought him into disgrace as a soldier, were not as yet
displayed or understood. At the present time he was eager to be of
essential service to the colonies, and he entered into the New York
project with spirit. In Connecticut the governor promptly seconded his
efforts, by calling out two regiments of volunteers to serve for six
weeks under the general, and appointed Colonels David Waterbury, of
Stamford, and Andrew Ward, of Guilford, to their command. By the 20th,
Lee found himself ready to proceed; but while on his way, near
Stamford, he received a communication from the Committee of Safety at
New York, representing that the rumors of his coming had created great
alarm in the city, and earnestly requesting him to halt his troops on
the Connecticut border, until his object were better known to the
committee. Here was something of a dilemma, and it may be asked how it
should have arisen. Why, indeed, was it necessary to organize a force
outside of New York to secure it? Was not this the time for the city
to prepare for her defence, and welcome assistance from whatever
quarter offered? The answer is to be found in the exceptional
political temperament of New York at this time. Her population
contained a large and powerful loyalist element, which hoped, with the
assistance of the three or four British men-of-war then in the harbor,
to be able to give the place, at the proper moment, into the hands of
the king's troops. Only a short time before, Governor Tryon had
informed Howe that it only needed the presence of a small force to
secure it, and develop a strong loyal support among the inhabitants of
both the city and colony. The patriotic party had abated none of its
zeal, but it recognized the danger of precipitating matters, and
accordingly pursued what appeared to colonists elsewhere to be a
temporizing and timid policy, but which proved the wisest course in
the end. The city was at the mercy of the men-of-war. Any attempt to
seize it could be answered with a bombardment. The situation required
prudent management; above all, it required delay on the part of the
Americans until they were ready for a decisive step. That the
Committee