g but a private individual. He had the right
to put his personal influence at the service of the State and of his
country if he considered that by so doing he could bring to an end a war
which threatened to bring destruction on a land that was just beginning to
progress toward civilisation. It must be remembered that his was the only
great personality in South Africa capable of opposing President Kruger and
the other Dutch and Boer leaders. He was still popular among many
people--feared by some, worshipped by others. He could rally round him
many elements that would never coalesce with either Dutch or English
unless he provided the impetus of his authority and approval. If only he
had spoken frankly to the Boer leaders whom he had caused to be
approached, called them to his side instead of having messages conveyed to
them by people whom he could disavow later on and whom, in fact, he did
disavow; and if, on the other hand, Rhodes had placed himself at the
disposal of Sir Alfred Milner, and told him openly that he would try to
see what he could do to help him, the tenseness of the situation would
almost certainly have been eased.
In a position as intermediary between two adversaries who required his
advice and influence to smooth the way toward a settlement of the terrible
South African question Rhodes could have done incalculable service and
added lustre to his name. But he did not, and it is not without interest
to seek the reason why the Colossus was not courageous enough to embark
upon such a course. Whether through fear of his actions being wrongly
interpreted, or else because he did not feel sure of his ground and was
apprehensive lest he might be induced to walk into a trap, Cecil Rhodes
never would pronounce himself upon one side or the other. He left to
well-wishers the task of reconciliation between himself and his enemies,
or, if not that, at least the possibility for both once more to take
common action for the solution of South African difficulties. The
unfortunate side of the whole affair lay in the fact that the Boer and
Bond leaders each remained under the impression that in the Raid affair it
was against their particular body that Rhodes had sinned, that it was
their cause which he had betrayed. Accordingly they expected him to
recognise this fact and to tell them of his regret.
But this was not Rhodes' way: on the contrary, he looked to his
adversaries to consider that they had wronged him. Both parti
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