I know
that our (French) government, is indeed fully sensible of the capital
importance to it of its interest in these parts, and has proceeded in
consequence. But it is not so, I find by your letters, and the reports
of others, with numbers in Europe, who do not conceive, that the present
object of the war is so considerable as it really is.

To say nothing of the vast extent of country that falls under the claim
of the English to Acadia (Nova-Scotia) which alone would form an immence
mass of dominion, greatly improveable in a number of points, its
situation is yet of greater weight. By the English possessing it, Canada
itself would be so streightened, so liable to harrassment, and
especially to the comptrol of its navigation, that it would scarce be
tenable, and surely not worth the expence of keeping. The country
pretended to have been ceded is far preferable to it; and the masters of
it would be equally masters of the sea all over North-America. Hallifax,
for example, according to which of the nation's hand it should be in,
may be equally an effectual check on Quebec, or Boston.

You will then allow, that was there even nothing more in dispute than
the limits of the cession of Acadia, or Nova-Scotia, together with its
necessary dependence, that alone would form such a considerable object,
as not easily to be given up on either side. The commissaries appointed
by both crowns, then failing of coming to any agreement or regulation,
it is no wonder to see the appeal lodged with the sword; especially when
there is another point yet remains, of perhaps equal, if not superior,
importance, depending on the issue of the war: and that is, the western
inland frontiers of the English colonies. Should we ever command the
navigation of the lakes and rivers, behind their settlements, you can
easily figure to yourself, not only the vast advantages of preserving
that communication of Canada, with New Orleans and the Mississippi, so
absolutely essential to both these our colonies, but the facility it
will give us on all occasions of distressing the English, where neither
their marine-force can succor them, nor can they be able to resist the
attack, since we may make it wherever ever we please, and effectually
dodge any land-force they might assemble in any one or two parts to
oppose us. We may then carry the war into the quarter most convenient;
and most safe for us, if we should ever have the whole navigation of the
lakes so far a