importance in the
American system of the Federal Constitution. A senator would be less
likely to be an efficient and public-spirited legislator, in case he
were not obliged at regular intervals to prove title to his distinction.
A justice of the Supreme Court, on the other hand, can the better
perform his special task, provided he has a firm and permanent hold upon
his office. He cannot, to be sure, entirely escape responsibility to
public opinion, but his primary duty is to expound the Constitution as
he understands it; and it is a duty which demands the utmost personal
independence. The fault with the American system in this respect
consists not in the independence of the Federal judiciary, but in the
practical immutability of the Constitution. If the instrument which the
Supreme Court expounds could be altered whenever a sufficiently large
body of public opinion has demanded a change for a sufficiently long
time, the American democracy would have much more to gain than to fear
from the independence of the Federal judiciary.

The interest of individual liberty in relation to the organization of
democracy demands simply that the individual officeholder should possess
an amount of power and independence adequate to the efficient
performance of his work. The work of a justice of the Supreme Court
demands a power that is absolute for its own special work, and it
demands technically complete independence. An executive should, as a
rule, serve for a longer term, and hold a position of greater
independence than a legislator, because his work of enforcing the laws
and attending to the business details of government demands continuity,
complete responsibility within its own sphere, and the necessity
occasionally of braving adverse currents of public opinion. The term of
service and the technical independence of a legislator might well be
more restricted than that of an executive; but even a legislator should
be granted as much power and independence as he may need for the
official performance of his public duty. The American democracy has
shown its enmity to individual political liberty, not because it has
required its political favorites constantly to seek reelection, but
because it has since 1800 tended to refuse to its favorites during their
official term as much power and independence as is needed for
administrative, legislative, and judicial efficiency. It has been
jealous of the power it delegated, and has tried to take