es," vol. iii., p. 301; Madelin's "Fouche," p.
267.]

[Footnote 129: For the story about Arena's dagger, raised against
Bonaparte see Sciout, vol. iv., p. 652. It seems due to Lucien
Bonaparte. I take the curious details about Bonaparte's sudden pallor
from Roederer ("Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 302), who heard it from
Montrond, Talleyrand's secretary. So Aulard, "Hist, de la Rev. Fr.,"
p. 699.]

[Footnote 130: Napoleon explained to Metternich in 1812 why he wished
to silence the _Corps Legislatif_; "In France everyone runs after
applause: they want to be noticed and applauded.... Silence an
Assembly, which, if it is anything, must be deliberative, and you
discredit it."--Metternich's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 151.]

[Footnote 131: This was still further assured by the first elections
under the new system being postponed till 1801; the functionaries
chosen by the Consuls were then placed on the lists of notabilities of
the nation without vote. The constitution was put in force Dec. 25th,
1799.]

[Footnote 132: Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 303. He was the
go-between for Bonaparte and Sieyes.]

[Footnote 133: See the "Souvenirs" of Mathieu Dumas for the skilful
manner in which Bonaparte gained over the services of this
constitutional royalist and employed him to raise a body of volunteer
horse.]

[Footnote 134: "Lettres inedites de Napoleon," February 21st, 1800;
"Memoires du General d'Andigne," ch. xv.; Madelin's "Fouche," p. 306.]

[Footnote 135: "Georges Cadoudal," par son neveu, G. de Cadoudal; Hyde
de Neuville, vol. i., p. 305.]

[Footnote 136: Talleyrand, "Mems.," vol. i., part ii.; Marmont, bk.
v.]

[Footnote 137: "F.O.," Austria, No. 58; "Castlereagh's Despatches," v.
_ad init._ Bowman, in his excellent monograph, "Preliminary Stages of
the Peace of Amiens" (Toronto, 1899), has not noted this.]

[Footnote 138: "Nap. Correspond.," February 27th 1800; Thugut,
"Briefe" vol. ii., pp. 444-446; Oncken, "Zeitalter," vol. ii. p. 45.]

[Footnote 139: A Foreign Office despatch, dated Downing Street,
February 8th, 1800, to Vienna, promised a loan and that 15,000 or
20,000 British troops should be employed in the Mediterranean to act
in concert with the Austrians there, and to give "support to the
royalist insurrections in the southern provinces of France." No
differences of opinion respecting Piedmont can be held a sufficient
excuse for the failure of the British Government to fulfil this
promise--a failure wh