d joy and sorrow; and in Italy, the loss of Tarentum was an
injury and a source of grief to them, while the unexpected
preservation of the citadel with the garrison was matter of joy to
them. The sudden terror and panic occasioned by the siege and attack
of Rome, was turned into joy by the capture of Capua, a few days
after. Their affairs beyond sea also were equalized by a kind of
compensation. Philip had become their enemy at a juncture somewhat
unseasonable; but then the Aetolians, and Attalus, king of Asia, were
added to their allies; fortune now, in a manner, promising to the
Romans the empire of the east. The Carthaginians also set the loss of
Capua against the capture of Tarentum; and as they considered it as
glorious to them to have reached the walls of Rome without opposition,
so they were chagrined at the failure of their attempt, and they felt
ashamed that they had been held in such contempt, that while they lay
under the walls of Rome, a Roman army was marched out for Spain at an
opposite gate. With regard also to Spain itself, the greater the
reason was to hope that the war there was terminated, and that the
Romans were driven from the country, after the destruction of two such
renowned generals and their armies, so much the greater was the
indignation felt, that the victory had been rendered void and
fruitless by Lucius Marcius, a general irregularly appointed. Thus
fortune balancing events against each other, all was suspense and
uncertainty on both sides, their hopes and their fears being as strong
as though they were now first commencing the war.

38. What grieved Hannibal more than any thing was the fact, that Capua
having been more perseveringly besieged by the Romans than defended by
him, had turned from him the regard of many of the states of Italy,
and it was not only impossible for him to retain possession of all
these by means of garrisons, unless he could make up his mind to tear
his army into a number of small portions, which at that time was most
inexpedient, but he could not, by withdrawing the garrisons, leave the
fidelity of his allies open to the influence of hope, or subject to
that of fear. His disposition, which was strongly inclined to avarice
and cruelty, induced him to plunder the places he could not keep
possession of, that they might be left for the enemy in a state of
desolation. This resolution was equally horrid in principle and in its
issue, for not only were the affections of