bove is of necessity a very concise presentation of the salient
points of General Wilson's remarkable campaign, conducted alone by mounted
troops. It is not claimed that the account is new. I have published it
heretofore in extended form, though not in the press. This briefer story
cannot but be a repetition of the facts and a synopsis of the fuller
statement of them. It is a chapter in our war history than which no other
is more replete with thrilling and brilliant incident, with skillful
planning, and bold and successful execution. No purely cavalry campaign
in our war approached it in these features. It is doubtful whether its
parallel can be found in the cavalry annals of any modern nation. And to
this general statement should be added that the officer who commanded it,
who was its organizer and its controlling spirit, the one upon whom
General George H. Thomas leaned as one of his most trusted lieutenants and
advisers, was only twenty-seven years old.

It is not strange that Lee's and Johnston's surrender fixed the attention
of the country and turned it away from General Wilson's campaign. Had
these two events been delayed a month the land would have rung with
Wilson's praises and with new honors for General Thomas. Indeed, had the
withdrawal from Richmond and the events which so quickly followed it been
only delayed in their beginning by a few days necessary to have informed
the country of Wilson's marvelous successes, it is certain that his
breaking up of these interior storehouses of military material, and the
destruction of these many plants for producing more, would have
inseparably and largely connected themselves in the minds of the people
with the eastern surrender as cause and effect.

It was a campaign whose success would have been the same had Lee been able
to hold on to Richmond, and had Johnston so eluded Sherman as to prolong
the contest in Virginia and North Carolina.

THOMAS'S PLAN THOUGHT OUT AND FOLLOWED.

From the first this cavalry campaign had proceeded according to a clearly
formed plan. It was made after full conference with General Wilson. First,
it was decided that to render an attack upon Hood's line certain of
success a sufficient cavalry force must be in hand to turn his flank. The
next requirement, that of pursuing so effectively as to break up Hood,
could not be met without sufficient cavalry. So General Thomas held on in
the face of what has been related till he was so nearly read