emoved, even for many months, the same painful feeling of
these lost extremities is occasionally experienced. This circumstance
would render it probable that the larger branch of the nerve becomes
itself impregnated with the sensation it transmits: indeed it is a
continuation of the same substance, from its sentient extremity to its
sensorial insertion. This intimate union of nerve and brain may be
further illustrated: it has been already noticed, that a morbid state of
the organs of sense will convey inaccurate perceptions; and it is
equally certain, that disease of the brain, will excite phantasms, which
appear as realities to the sensitive organs.
As consciousness is implied, in order to constitute the act of
perception, it is of some importance to investigate the nature and
meaning of this term. The consciousness of _having experienced_ a
perception by any of the senses would be an act of memory:
consciousness, therefore, applies to the past; and it also accompanies
our prediction of the future. When a person is writing a letter, he is
at the time, conscious that his own hand is forming the characters; if
this letter be afterwards submitted to his inspection, he is conscious
that he wrote it; and if he be desired to write it over again, he is
conscious that it will bear, both to himself and others, the character
of his hand-writing. Consciousness, therefore, accompanies human action
through all its tenses: it is equivalent to the knowledge we possess of
our own personal identity, the evidence of mind, and therefore must
accompany every act of intelligence. Thus we are equally conscious that
we perceive, remember, think or reflect, and reason. As consciousness
must accompany every act of perception, it follows that we cannot be
impressed with more than one at the same instant; for it can never be
contended that we are able to experience two acts of consciousness at
the same moment. The very term two, implies repetition or succession,
and we could as well conceive the possibility of being, at the same
time, in two different places.
As far as we are warranted to infer from the evidences it affords, an
infant appears to possess no consciousness; but it may be considered of
early acquirement, and coeval with distinctness of perception.
These few preliminary remarks concerning perception have been submitted
to the notice of the reader, in order to advance to another subject. The
faculties which constitute mind are so
|