we have to stick to the non-psychological point of view
whenever man's life, his thoughts and feelings and volitions, are to be
measured with reference to ideals; that is in ethics and aesthetics and
logic, sciences which ask whether the volitions are good or bad, whether
the feelings are valuable or worthless, whether the thoughts are true or
false. The psychologist does not care; just as the botanist is
interested in the weed as much as in the flower, the psychologist is
interested in the causal connections of the most heinous crime not less
than in those of the noblest deed, in the structure of the most absurd
error not less than in that of the maturest wisdom. Truth, beauty, and
morality are thus expressions of the self in its purposive aspect.
We can go one step further. Those who narrowly seek every truth only in
the scientific understanding, ought to be reminded that this seeking for
causal connections is itself, after all, only a life experience which as
such is not of causal but of purposive character. "Life is bigger than
thought." In the immediate reality of our purposive life we aim towards
mastering the world by a causal understanding, and for this end we
create science; but this aim itself is then a purpose and not an object.
The first act is thus for us, the thinkers, not a part of the causal
events, but a purposive intention towards an ideal. Therefore, our
purposes have the first right; they represent the fundamental reality;
the value of causal connections and thus of all scientific and
psychological explanation, depends on the value of the purpose. Causal
truth can be only the second word; the first word remains to purposive
truth. From this point of view we may understand why there is no
conflict between the most consistent causal explanation of mental life
on the one side, and an idealistic view of life on the other side; yes,
we can see that the fullest emphasis on a scientific psychology--which
is necessarily realistic and, to a certain degree, materialistic--is
fully embedded in an idealistic philosophy of life, and that without
conflict. And we shall see how this consistency in sharply separating
the psychological view from the non-psychological, secures much greater
safety for true idealism than the inconsistent popular mixing of the
two principles, where scientific psychology is constantly encroached
upon by demands of faith and religion, and where faith and religion seem
constantly in danger
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