n the same envelope which contained Lincoln's letter to Gen. Curtis
inclosing the order for the supersedure of Gen. Fremont, was another
reading as follows:

Washington, Oct. 24, 1861. To the Commander of the
Department of the West

Sir: The command of the Department of the West having
devolved upon you, I propose to offer you a few suggestions.
Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander
in the field to specific lines and operations, as so much
always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing
events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable
margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.
The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is
believed to have passed Dade County in full retreat upon
northwestern Arkansas, leaving Missouri almost freed from
the enemy, excepting in the southeast of the State.
Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are
not likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making
too long a line from your own base of supplies and
reinforcements, that you should give up the pursuit halt
your main army, divide it into two corps of observation,
one occupying Sedalla and the other Rolla, the present
termini of railroad; then recruit the condition of both
corps by reestablishing and improving their discipline and
instruction, perfecting their clothing and equipments, and
providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course, both
railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously
employing just so much force as is necessary for this. 'From
these two points, Sedalia and Rolla, and especially in
judicious cooperation with Lane on the Kansas border, it
would be so easy to concentrate and repel an army of the
enemy returning on Missouri from the southwest that It is
not probable any such attempt to return will be made before
or during the approaching cold weather.

289

Before Spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no
favorable mood to renew for next year the troubles which
have so much afflicted and impoverished them during this. If
you adopt this line of policy, and if, as I anticipate, you
will see no enemy in great force approaching, you will have
a surplus of force, which you can withdraw from these points
and direct t