turn of the fleet from its journey round the world, the Navy
Department had calculated as follows: Japan had fifteen battleships, six
large new ones and nine older ones; in addition she had six large new
and eight older armored cruisers. We have one armored cruiser and three
cruisers in Manila, and these can take care of at least five Japanese
armored cruisers. Japan therefore has fifteen battleships and nine
armored cruisers left for making an attack. Now if we keep two
squadrons, each consisting of six battleships--the _Texas_ among
them--off the Pacific coast and add to these the coast-batteries, the
mines and the submarines, we shall possess a naval force which the enemy
will never dare attack.

Japan, on the other hand, figured as follows: We have two squadrons,
each consisting of six battleships, among which there are six that are
superior to any American fighting ship; these with the nine armored
cruisers and the advantage of a complete surprise, give us such a
handicap that we have nothing to fear. As a reserve, lying off San
Francisco, are the ironclads _Hizen_ (ex _Retvisan_), _Tango_ (ex
_Poltawa_), _Iki_ (ex _Nicolai_), and the armored cruisers _Azuma_,
_Idzumo_, _Asama_, _Tokiwa_, and _Yakumo_. Besides these there are the
two mortar-boat divisions and the cruisers sent to Seattle, while the
armored cruiser _Iwate_ and two destroyers were sent to Magdalen Bay.
All that remained in home waters were the fourth squadron, consisting of
former Russian ships, and the cruisers which would soon be relieved at
the Philippines.

The enemy had figured correctly and we had not. The two battles of the
seventh and eighth of May were decided in the first ten minutes, before
we had fired a single shot. And would the Japanese calculation have been
correct also if Perry had beaten Togo or Crane Kamimura? Most decidedly
so, for not a single naval harbor or coaling-station, or repairing-dock
on the Pacific coast would have been ready to receive Perry or Crane
with their badly damaged squadrons. On the other hand, the remnants of
our fleet would have had all the Japanese battleships, all the armored
cruisers and a large collection of torpedo-boats continually on their
heels, and would thus have been forced to another battle in which, being
entirely without a base of operations, they would without a doubt have
suffered a complete defeat.

Our mines in the various arsenals and our three submarines at the Mare
Island Wharf in Sa