foresee the fall of His creatures whom He had
destined to happiness? If He resolved in His decrees to allow this fall,
there is no doubt that He desired it to take place: otherwise it would
not have happened. If the Divine foresight of the sin of His creatures
had been necessary or forced, it might be supposed that God was
compelled by His justice to punish the guilty; but God, enjoying the
faculty of foresight and the power to predestinate everything, would it
not depend upon Himself not to impose upon men these cruel laws? Or, at
least, could He not have dispensed with creating beings whom He might be
compelled to punish and to render unhappy by a subsequent decree? What
does it matter whether God destined men to happiness or to misery by a
previous decree, the effect of His foresight, or by a subsequent decree,
the effect of His justice. Does the arrangement of these decrees change
the fate of the miserable? Would they not have the right to complain of
a God who, having the power of leaving them in oblivion, brought them
forth, although He foresaw very well that His justice would force Him
sooner or later to punish them?

LXXIV.--ABSURDITY OF THE THEOLOGICAL FABLES UPON ORIGINAL SIN AND UPON
SATAN.

Man, say you, issuing from the hands of God, was pure, innocent, and
good; but his nature became corrupted in consequence of sin. If man
could sin, when just leaving the hands of God, his nature was then not
perfect! Why did God permit him to sin, and his nature to become
corrupt? Why did God allow him to be seduced, knowing well that he would
be too weak to resist the tempter? Why did God create a Satan, a
malicious spirit, a tempter? Why did not God, who was so desirous of
doing good to mankind, why did He not annihilate, once for all, so many
evil genii whose nature rendered them enemies of our happiness? Or
rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victories and terrible
influences upon the human race He must have foreseen? Finally, by what
fatality, in all the religions of the world, has the evil principle such
a marked advantage over the good principle or over Divinity?

LXXV.--THE DEVIL, LIKE RELIGION, WAS INVENTED TO ENRICH THE PRIESTS.

We are told a story of the simple-heartedness of an Italian monk, which
does him honor. This good man preaching one day felt obliged to announce
to his auditory that, thanks to Heaven, he had at last discovered a sure
means of rendering all men happy. "The devi