e the defeat of Colonel Tarleton, by General Morgan. These
events speak best for themselves, and no doubt will suggest what is
necessary to be done to prevent the successive losses of State after
State, to which the want of arms, and of a regular soldiery, seem more
especially to expose those in the South.

I have the honor to be, with every sentiment of respect, your
Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,

Th: Jefferson.

LETTER XLIII.--TO GENERAL WASHINGTON, February 17, 1781

TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Richmond, February 17, 1781.

Sir,

By a letter from General Greene, dated Guilford Court House, February
10th, we are informed that Lord Cornwallis had burned his own wagons in
order to enable himself to move with greater facility, and had pressed
immediately on. The prisoners taken at the Cow-pens, were happily saved
by the accidental rise of a water-course, which gave so much time as to
withdraw them from the reach of the enemy. Lord Cornwallis had advanced
to the vicinities of the Moravian towns, and was still moving on
rapidly. His object was supposed to be to compel General Greene to an
action, which, under the difference of force they had, would probably
be ruinous to the latter. General Greene meant to retire by the way of
Boyd's Ferry, on the Roanoke. As yet he had lost little or no stores or
baggage, but they were far from being safe. In the instant of receiving
this intelligence, we ordered a reinforcement of militia to him, from
the most convenient counties in which there was a hope of finding any
arms. Some great event must arise from the present situation of things,
which, for a long time, will determine the condition of southern
affairs.

Arnold lies close in his quarters. Two days ago, I received information
of the arrival of a sixty-four gun ship and two frigates in our bay,
being part of the fleet of our good ally at Rhode Island. Could they
get at the British fleet here, they are sufficient to destroy them; but
these being drawn up into Elizabeth river, into which the sixty-four
cannot enter, I apprehend they could do nothing more than block up the
river. This, indeed, would reduce the enemy, as we could cut off their
supplies by land; but the operation being tedious, would probably be
too dangerous for the auxiliary force. Not having yet had any particular
information of the designs of the French Commander, I cannot pretend to
say what measures this aid wil