atent longing to be conformed
to the good. There is the sense that he fulfils himself then only when
he is obedient to the good. One of the great facts of spiritual
experience is this gradual, or even sudden, inversion of standard within
us. We do really cease to desire the things which are against right
reason and conscience. We come to desire the good, even if it shall cost
us pain and sacrifice to do it. Paul could write: 'When I would do good,
evil is present with me.' But, in the vividness of his identification of
his willing self with his better self against his sinning self, he could
also write: 'So then it is no more I that do the sin.' _Das radicale
Boese_ of human nature is less radical than Kant supposed, and 'the
categorical imperative' of duty less externally categorical than he
alleged. Still it is the great merit of Kant's philosophy to have
brought out with all possible emphasis, not merely as against the
optimism of the shallow, but as against the hedonism of soberer people,
that our life is a conflict between inclination and duty. The claims of
duty are the higher ones. They are mandatory, absolute. We do our duty
whether or not we superficially desire to do it. We do our duty whether
or not we foresee advantage in having done it. We should do it if we
foresaw with clearness disadvantage. We should find our satisfaction in
having done it, even at the cost of all our other satisfactions. There
is a must which is over and above all our desires. This is what Kant
really means by the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, his statement
comes in conflict with the principle of freedom, which is one of the
most fundamental in his system. The phrases above used only eddy about
the one point which is to be held fast. There may be that in the
universe which destroys the man who does not conform to it, but in the
last analysis he is self-destroyed, that is, he chooses not to conform.
If he is saved, it is because he chooses thus to conform. Man would be
then most truly man in resisting that which would merely overpower him,
even if it were goodness. Of course, there can be no goodness which
overpowers. There can be no goodness which is not willed. Nothing can be
a motive except through awakening our desire. That which one desires is
never wholly external to oneself.

According to Kant, morality becomes religion when that which the former
shows to be the end of man is conceived also to be the end of the
supreme law