river, which was unfordable at that point; their right
extended to and across a swamp, and united them with the Indians, under
Tecumseh, amounting to near eighteen hundred. The British artillery was
placed in the road along the margin of the river, near to the left of
their line. At from two to three hundred yards from the river, a swamp
extends nearly parallel to it, the intermediate ground being dry. This
position of the enemy, with his flank protected on the left by the
river and on the right by the swamp, filled with Indians, being such as
to prevent the wings from being turned, general Harrison made
arrangements to concentrate his forces against the British line. The
first division, under major general Henry, was formed in three lines at
one hundred yards from each other; the front line consisting of
Trotter's brigade, the second of Chiles', and the reserve of King's
brigade. These lines were in front of, and parallel to, the British
troops. The second division, under major general Desha, composed of
Allen's and Caldwell's brigades, was formed _en potence_, or at right
angles to the first division. Governor Shelby, as senior major general
of the Kentucky troops, was posted at this crotchet, formed between the
first and second divisions. Colonel Simrall's regiment of light
infantry was formed in reserve, obliquely to the first division, and
covering the rear of the front division; and, after much reflection as
to the disposition to be made of colonel Johnson's mounted troops, they
were directed, as soon as the front line advanced, to take ground to
the left, and forming upon that flank, to endeavor to turn the right of
the Indians. A detachment of regular troops, of the 26th United States
infantry, under colonel Paul, occupied the space between the road and
the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery; and,
simultaneously with this movement, forty friendly Indians were to pass
under the bank of the stream to the rear of the British line, and by
their fire and war-cry, induce the enemy to think their own Indians
were turning against them. At the same time, colonel Wood had been
instructed to make preparations for using the enemy's artillery, and to
rake their own line by a flank fire. By refusing the left or second
division, the Indians were kept _in the air_, that is, in a position in
which they would be useless. It will be seen, as the commander
anticipated, that they waited in their position the advan