m of armed smuggling; secondly,
by open armed intervention in the wars of 1840 and 1857; and thirdly, by
the imperious logic of Lord Elgin and others. Now, as to the armed
smugglers, the answer is easy. They were armed to resist pirates, who
swarm in the bays and creeks so abundant in the Chinese coast-line of
3,500 miles; and by no means, as implied, to fall foul of the Custom House
officials. These were always amenable enough, and a recognized bribe paid
in due time freed all opium vessels from farther molestation in that
quarter. The second assumption, that the wars were opium wars, false as it
is in reality when thus stated, is a most plausible one; for opium was
certainly the _immediate_ cause of the first war. But it was not the real
cause. European ideas of the equality of nations could not be reconciled
with the insolent pretensions of the Chinese with regard to all
foreigners. This, and much more to the same effect, has already been dwelt
upon in the historical survey, and so need not detain us any longer now.
We may, however, add that no mention whatever of opium was made in the
Nankin Treaty, so that the edicts against the drug remained in force,
though they were no more regarded now than before the war. And this was
certainly not because the Chinese were exhausted by the war and afraid of
a fresh conflict with the English. It is doubtful whether the authorities
at Pekin really considered themselves beaten at all, and the reason why
their edicts were disregarded was not that defeat had weakened the hands
of the executive, but, as before, simply the corruption of the officials,
and the imperious desire of the people for the drug. With regard to the
second war, it is absurd to call that an opium war. Opium had nothing to
do with its commencement, renewal, or end; nor was it even alluded to in
the Treaty of Tientsin. It was only some months after the ratification of
that treaty that in arranging the tariff of imports the Chinese
Commissioner himself suggested that opium should pay a fixed tariff and be
admitted as a legal import. No doubt Lord Elgin, and here he was seconded
by the American Minister, as Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir J. Davis before
the war, pointed out to the Chinese how eminently desirable it was that
this "stone of offence" should be removed, but in reality it was the
persuasive logic of facts which induced the Chinese to propose the
legalization of the import. This second war, like the former one,