ch infantry, it
will be remembered (and my frontispiece shows it), stood as to their first
line in front of the cavalry in the main central body. This almost
undisputed passage of the Nebel would not have been possible had not the
distance between Blenheim and Oberglauheim been what it was. The gap was
great, the French line defending it too thin, and the possibility of a
cross fire defending the centre was eliminated by the width of that
centre.

Even as it was, the passage of the Nebel led to one very difficult moment
which might by accident or genius have turned the whole action in favour
of the French; and in connection with this episode it must be remembered
that the French commanders asserted that the passage of the Nebel was no
success on the part of their enemy, but was deliberately permitted to that
enemy in order that he might be overwhelmed upon the opposing slope, with
the marshy stream behind him, when the time for a counter-attack should
come.

The moment came when the greater part of Marlborough's cavalry had
crossed, but before they had fully formed upon the further bank. While
they were still in the disorder of forming, the French cavalry upon their
left--that is, between the main road and Blenheim--charged down the
slight slope, and something like a dismemberment of the whole of
Marlborough's mounted line began. It was checked for a moment by the fire
of the British infantry, during which check Marlborough brought over
certain Danish and Hanoverian squadrons which had remained upon the
further bank. But the French charged again, and though infantry of
Marlborough's which was pouring over the stream up beyond the stone bridge
came up in time to prevent a complete break down, the moment was critical
in the extreme. All Marlborough's centre was pressed and shaken; a further
spurt against it and it would break.

It was such a moment as commanders of rapid decision and quick eye have
always seized; and if it be asked how Tallard should have seized it, the
answer is that there were French guns to mass, there was French infantry
in Blenheim unused, and more in reserve behind Blenheim wholly useless.
There were the ten squadrons of Tallard's second line of cavalry under
Silly, a couple of hundred yards away, to be summoned in a few moments.

Rapid decision and keen sight of this sort would have done the business;
but Tallard was slow of perception; an excellent strategist, but
short-sighted and a great gen