king of the government. A
compromise, accordingly, is at times indispensable and laudable. But no
valid defence can be made of the celebrated compromise of 1850. It was
a monstrous corruption in legislation, which not even the great name of
Henry Clay could shield from subsequent opprobrium.

Still, this compromise was accepted and ratified by a great majority of
the American people, both in the North and in the South. The
announcement that all sectional differences had been adjusted was hailed
with almost universal joy. The terms of settlement were regarded as of
subordinate consequence. The people wanted peace and prosperity, and
were content with driving a lucrative business. They had no disposition
to shed each other's blood in a quarrel concerning the condition of
negroes. The compromise had taken no money from their pockets. It had
imposed upon them no pecuniary burdens. It had exposed them to no
personal dangers. It had rather appeased the terrors of disunion,
increased the facilities for money-making, and opened a brilliant
prospect of national greatness, security, and peace.

But this same compromise contained the seeds of disunion and civil war.
The extreme State-Rights party in the South resolved not to submit to
it, but to prepare the people for forcible resistance. Still, the time
had not yet come for open demonstrations. The new Fugitive-Slave Law
produced a wide-spread excitement at the North. This was increased by
the frequent cases of brutality which occurred under its execution. The
progress of opinion was rapid and decisive, preparing for the bloody
conflict which commenced with the attack on Fort Sumter.

The development of events from this cardinal epoch to the defeat of the
Union arms at Ball's Bluff, is traced by Mr. Greeley with a vigorous and
discriminating pen. His comments may not always command conviction, but
they can never fail to win respect. He expresses himself with freedom,
although temperately, in regard to the character of the prominent
military leaders, and subsequent facts have confirmed the sagacity of
his judgment. He holds General Scott to a rigid responsibility for the
inglorious days of Bull Run, which dispelled all lingering illusions as
to his capacity for the conduct of a great war. The Fabian policy of
General McClellan in the campaign of the succeeding winter is ably
discussed. According to Mr. Greeley, this is not to be accounted for by
a constitutional aversion on the