he right, with bomb and bayonet, drove the Germans from
the trenches; and then together they forced their way into the
Teutons' position 600 yards along a front 800 yards in length. Early
the next morning, before daylight on May 16, 1915, the British Seventh
Division forced its way into the German salient at Festubert. In the
meantime the Germans were making hasty preparations for a
counterattack. Sir John French's plan, however, had proved effective.
It would have required a large supply of high-explosive shells to have
made much of an impression on the excellent defenses which the German
soldiers had constructed on this part of the front. The British had no
such supply of ammunition, and, even if they had had it, it is
doubtful if they would have been able to demolish the formidable wire
entanglements. Yet in this night attack with the bayonet the British
troops had accomplished all they could have done if supplied with
proper ammunition. In the desperate charge which they made no wire
entanglement could stop the British soldiers. They threw their
overcoats or blankets over the barbed wire and then climbed across the
obstruction. The Seventh Division took three lines of trenches in this
manner, until it was 12,000 yards back of the original line of its
enemy.
There were now two wedges driven into the German front, and the
British desired to join them and make what might be termed a
countersalient, or a salient running into the original salient of the
Germans. But the space between the two horns of the British force was
a network of trenches. The horns might prod and irritate the Teutons,
but they needed artillery again to rid the German breastworks of
machine guns and demolish the obstructions which would cost too many
lives to take in the same manner in which the British success had been
won in its night attack. Nevertheless the British started in to bomb
their way toward Festubert, and they even gained forty yards in this
hazardous undertaking before they were forced to stop. If they had
seemed to be an irresistible force, they had met what had every
appearance of being an immovable body--and there was a limit to human
endurance.
By May 17, 1915, the British concluded that their most advisable
offensive was to clear the space between their two wedges by cutting
off the Germans who held that part of their line. To do this the
British attempted to cut off the German communication to the north
from La Quinque Rue;
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