will not have
proper material to work upon. Just as the material of knowledge is
supplied through the senses, so the material of ethical knowledge is
supplied by emotional responsiveness. It is difficult to put this
quality into words, but we all know the difference between the character
which is hard and formal, and one which is sympathetic, flexible, and
open. In the abstract the former may be as sincerely devoted to moral
ideas as is the latter, but as a practical matter we prefer to live with
the latter. We count upon it to accomplish more by tact, by instinctive
recognition of the claims of others, by skill in adjusting, than the
former can accomplish by mere attachment to rules.

Here, then, is the moral standard, by which to test the work of the
school upon the side of what it does directly for individuals. (_a_)
Does the school as a system, at present, attach sufficient importance to
the spontaneous instincts and impulses? Does it afford sufficient
opportunity for these to assert themselves and work out their own
results? Can we even say that the school in principle attaches itself,
at present, to the active constructive powers rather than to processes
of absorption and learning? Does not our talk about self-activity
largely render itself meaningless because the self-activity we have in
mind is purely "intellectual," out of relation to those impulses which
work through hand and eye?

Just in so far as the present school methods fail to meet the test of
such questions moral results must be unsatisfactory. We cannot secure
the development of positive force of character unless we are willing to
pay its price. We cannot smother and repress the child's powers, or
gradually abort them (from failure of opportunity for exercise), and
then expect a character with initiative and consecutive industry. I am
aware of the importance attaching to inhibition, but mere inhibition is
valueless. The only restraint, the only holding-in, that is of any worth
is that which comes through holding powers concentrated upon a positive
end. An end cannot be attained excepting as instincts and impulses are
kept from discharging at random and from running off on side tracks. In
keeping powers at work upon their relevant ends, there is sufficient
opportunity for genuine inhibition. To say that inhibition is higher
than power, is like saying that death is more than life, negation more
than affirmation, sacrifice more than service.

(_b_) W