llion five hundred thousand livres, and four
millions for the support of his army, which he was to command under the
orders of the French king. To inflame his zeal, and to accelerate the
conquest of Alsace, France did not hesitate, by a secret article, to
promise him that province for his services; a promise which Richelieu
had little intention of performing, and which the duke also estimated at
its real worth. But Bernard confided in his good fortune, and in his
arms, and met artifice with dissimulation. If he could once succeed in
wresting Alsace from the enemy, he did not despair of being able, in
case of need, to maintain it also against a friend. He now raised an
army at the expense of France, which he commanded nominally under the
orders of that power, but in reality without any limitation whatever,
and without having wholly abandoned his engagements with Sweden. He
began his operations upon the Rhine, where another French army, under
Cardinal Lavalette, had already, in 1635, commenced hostilities against
the Emperor.

Against this force, the main body of the Imperialists, after the great
victory of Nordlingen, and the reduction of Swabia and Franconia had
advanced under the command of Gallas, had driven them as far as Metz,
cleared the Rhine, and took from the Swedes the towns of Metz and
Frankenthal, of which they were in possession. But frustrated by the
vigorous resistance of the French, in his main object, of taking up his
winter quarters in France, he led back his exhausted troops into Alsace
and Swabia. At the opening of the next campaign, he passed the Rhine at
Breysach, and prepared to carry the war into the interior of France. He
actually entered Burgundy, while the Spaniards from the Netherlands made
progress in Picardy; and John De Werth, a formidable general of the
League, and a celebrated partisan, pushed his march into Champagne, and
spread consternation even to the gates of Paris. But an insignificant
fortress in Franche Comte completely checked the Imperialists, and they
were obliged, a second time, to abandon their enterprise.

The activity of Duke Bernard had hitherto been impeded by his dependence
on a French general, more suited to the priestly robe, than to the baton
of command; and although, in conjunction with him, he conquered Alsace
Saverne, he found himself unable, in the years 1636 and 1637, to
maintain his position upon the Rhine. The ill success of the French
arms in the Netherlands