uld not think it just if it were taken from me by
people who intended to misuse it, as I have misused it, for their own
personal gratification.

It was made a matter of merriment in the case of William Morris that
he preached the doctrines of socialism while he was a prosperous
manufacturer; but I see that he was perfectly consistent. There is no
justice, for instance, about the principle of disarmament, unless all
nations loyally disarm at the same time. A person cannot be called upon
to strip himself of his personal property for disinterested reasons, if
he feels that he is surrounded by people who would use the spoils
for their own interest. The process must be carried out by a sincere
majority, who may then coerce the selfish minority. I have no conception
what I should do with my money if I determined that I ought not to
possess it. It ought not to be applied to any public purpose, because
under a socialist regime all public institutions would be supported by
the public, and they ought not to depend upon private generosity. Still
less do I think that it ought to be divided among individuals, because,
if they were disinterested persons, they ought to refuse to accept
it. The only good reason I should have for disencumbering myself of my
possessions would be that I might set a good example of the simple life,
by working hard for a livelihood, which is exactly what I do; and my
only misfortune is that my earnings and the interest of my accumulated
earnings produce a sum which is far larger than the average man ought
to possess. Thus the difficulty is a very real one. Moreover the evil of
personal property is that it tends to emphasise class-distinctions and
to give the possessors of it a sense of undue superiority. Now I am
democratic enough to maintain that I have no sense whatever of personal
superiority. I do not allow my possession of property to give me a life
of vacuous amusement, for the simple reason that my work amuses me far
more than any other form of occupation, If it is asked why I tend to
live by preference among what may be called my social equals, I reply
that the only people one is at ease with are the people whose social
traditions are the same as one's own, for the simple reason that one
does not then have to think about social traditions at all. I do not
think my social traditions are better than the social traditions of any
other stratum of society, whether it be described as above or below
my own