fesses their hatred to be hatred."[222]

[222] Zur Genealogie der Moral, Dritte Abhandlung, Section 14. I have
abridged, and in one place transposed, a sentence.

Poor Nietzsche's antipathy is itself sickly enough, but we all know
what he means, and he expresses well the clash between the two Ideals.
The carnivorous-minded "strong man," the adult male and cannibal, can
see nothing but mouldiness and morbidness in the saint's gentleness and
self-severity, and regards him with pure loathing. The whole feud
revolves essentially upon two pivots: Shall the seen world or the
unseen world be our chief sphere of adaptation? and must our means of
adaptation in this seen world be aggressiveness or non-resistance?

The debate is serious. In some sense and to some degree both worlds
must be acknowledged and taken account of; and in the seen world both
aggressiveness and non-resistance are needful. It is a question of
emphasis, of more or less. Is the saint's type or the strong-man's
type the more ideal?

It has often been supposed, and even now, I think, it is supposed by
most persons, that there can be one intrinsically ideal type of human
character. A certain kind of man, it is imagined, must be the best man
absolutely and apart from the utility of his function, apart from
economical considerations. The saint's type, and the knight's or
gentleman's type, have always been rival claimants of this absolute
ideality; and in the ideal of military religious orders both types were
in a manner blended. According to the empirical philosophy, however,
all ideals are matters of relation. It would be absurd, for example,
to ask for a definition of "the ideal horse," so long as dragging drays
and running races, bearing children, and jogging about with tradesmen's
packages all remain as indispensable differentiations of equine
function. You may take what you call a general all-round animal as a
compromise, but he will be inferior to any horse of a more specialized
type, in some one particular direction. We must not forget this now
when, in discussing saintliness, we ask if it be an ideal type of
manhood. We must test it by its economical relations.

I think that the method which Mr. Spencer uses in his Data of Ethics
will help to fix our opinion. Ideality in conduct is altogether a
matter of adaptation. A society where all were invariably aggressive
would destroy itself by inner friction, and in a society where some are