produce the same effects
on vulgar minds, as some others have done, it was not for want of power,
but from the turn and direction of his mind.[134] It was because his
subjects, his ideas, his arguments, were less vulgar. The question is not
whether he brought certain truths equally home to us, but how much nearer
he brought them than they were before. In my opinion, he united the two
extremes of refinement and strength in a higher degree than any other
writer whatever.

The subtlety of his mind was undoubtedly that which rendered Burke a less
popular writer and speaker than he otherwise would have been. It weakened
the impression of his observations upon others, but I cannot admit that it
weakened the observations themselves; that it took anything from their
real weight and solidity. Coarse minds think all that is subtle, futile:
that because it is not gross and obvious and palpable to the senses, it is
therefore light and frivolous, and of no importance in the real affairs of
life; thus making their own confined understandings the measure of truth,
and supposing that whatever they do not distinctly perceive, is nothing.
Seneca, who was not one of the vulgar, also says, that subtle truths are
those which have the least substance in them, and consequently approach
nearest to nonentity. But for my own part I cannot help thinking that the
most important truths must be the most refined and subtle; for that very
reason, that they must comprehend a great number of particulars, and
instead of referring to any distinct or positive fact, must point out the
combined effects of an extensive chain of causes, operating gradually,
remotely, and collectively, and therefore imperceptibly. General
principles are not the less true or important because from their nature
they elude immediate observation; they are like the air, which is not the
less necessary because we neither see nor feel it, or like that secret
influence which binds the world together, and holds the planets in their
orbits. The very same persons who are the most forward to laugh at all
systematic reasoning as idle and impertinent, you will the next moment
hear exclaiming bitterly against the baleful effects of new-fangled
systems of philosophy, or gravely descanting on the immense importance of
instilling sound principles of morality into the mind. It would not be a
bold conjecture, but an obvious truism to say, that all the great changes
which have been brought about in