result of His volitions or determinations. But where God does
not act, where He does nothing, He determines nothing. It is
childish to suppose that because when He acts, there must be a
determination to act, when he does not act, there must be a
determination not to act, since a determination is necessary to a
state of action, but it surely is not necessary to a state of rest.
When Jehovah created the present universe, is it necessary to
suppose that there existed in His mind a positive determination not
to create any of the other possible universes which were present to
His views? Surely not." But we should say, Surely yes. If twenty
plans are presented to me, and I select one only, does not this
imply the rejection of the others? To the Divine mind there must
have been present the conception of many different kinds of worlds
than the one we are in; but of the possibles He chose the present
system as, all things considered, the best. Had there been a better
world and God did not make it, it must have been, according to the
optimists, either because God did not know of it, or was unable to
make it, or was unwilling,--all of which suppositions are either
incompatible with the omniscience, the omnipotence, or the goodness
of God. When the Creator selected the present system, He rejected
the "possibles" that might have been brought into being. I am
surprised that Dr. Payne should say that "determination" is not
necessary to a state of rest, or non-action. In thousands of
instances non-action--rest--is as much the result of volition as is
the most determined activity. The old divines used to divide sin
into acts of commission and omission. But in every sin of omission
there was action implied. If I do not help the needy when he crieth,
my non-help--my rest as regards aid--carries action in it
--determination. Dr. Payne again says, "When God determined to save
man, did that volition necessarily imply a positive determination
not to save the angels who kept not their first estate? No one, it
is presumed, Will answer in the affirmative. It implies, indeed,
that fallen angels were not included in the merciful purpose of God,
that there was no volition to save them; but no degree of ingenuity
can gather any conclusion beyond this from the facts of the case.
Why, then, should a positive determination, on the part of God, to
save some of the human family be supposed to imply of necessity a
counter and positive determination not t