irst Division of
the Field Force; Major-General Sir C. F. Clery, commanding the Second
Division; and Major-General Sir W. F. Gatacre, commanding the Third
Division; and a large number of officers for service on the Staff.

THE INVASION OF CAPE COLONY

The position of affairs in the direction of the Orange River was at
first somewhat stationary. The British were awaiting the arrival of
troops and keeping on the alert; the Boers were making proclamations and
annexing adjacent villages.

A column from Cape Colony had started, and more troops were pushing up
as fast as train could carry them in the direction of De Aar. A letter
from a British officer from that place describes the state of affairs on
the 20th of October. He said:--

"This place is to be a big base when the British troops arrive; 10,000
are to come here, but are not expected for at least a month. At present
we are the only regiment here, and have to keep the line open and guard
all the stores coming up for the 10,000 troops. We have not got half
enough men, as the front of our position is nearly five miles, and we
cannot watch it properly. Our position is strong as long as we can hold
the hills; but if the Boers can get artillery near us, they will wipe us
out in a few hours without getting within rifle range at all, as we have
no guns ourselves. We keep on telegraphing for them, but the officials
at home and at Cape Town do not seem to understand the position. The
worst of this place is that there is not a loyal native within twenty
miles of us, and they are only waiting for a good opportunity to rise.
We can only be ready for them--that is, we cannot attack them, as they
have not yet declared openly for the Transvaal, though they are all
spies, and give the Boers information on all our dispositions."

In this short letter we find the keynote of all our subsequent troubles.
The complete and almost absurd confidence of the British, supported as
it was by valour without wisdom or activity, was a "voice" and nothing
more. Deeply have we suffered since those words were written, for an
arrogant under-estimation of the enemy, a reprehensible delay in
preparing for him, and a parsimonious system of carrying out those
preparations when attempted. However, it is useless to cry over spilt
milk.

To thoroughly appreciate the situation at this period it is necessary to
understand the direction in which our troops were moving. Modder River,