iently explained in the chapter on Federalism and
Anti-Federalism, and need not be dwelt upon. The whig attitude upon it
appears in all that follows.
II. The Bank.
The First United States Bank had perished by the expiration of its
charter in 1811. It had been very useful, indeed almost indispensable,
in managing the national finances, and its decease, with the consequent
financial disorder, was a most terrible drawback in the war. Recharter
was, however, by a very small majority, refused. The evils flowing from
this perverse step manifesting themselves day by day, a new Bank of the
United States, modelled closely after the first, was chartered on April
10, 1816, Clay, Calhoun, and Webster being its chief champions.
Republican opponents, Madison among them, were brought around by the
plea that war had proved a national bank a necessary and hence a
constitutional helper of the Government in its appointed work.
In the management of this second bank there were disorder and
dishonesty, which greatly limited its usefulness. This, notwithstanding,
was considerable. The credit of the nation was restored and its treasury
resumed specie payments. But confidence in the institution was shaken.
We shall see how it met with President Jackson's opposition on every
possible occasion. In 1832 he vetoed a bill for the renewal of its
charter, to expire in 1836, and in 1833 caused all the Government's
deposits in it, amounting to ten million dollars, to be removed. These
blows were fatal to the bank, though it secured a charter from
Pennsylvania and existed, languishing, till 1839.
III. The Tariff.
Until the War of 1812 the main purpose of our tariff policy had been
revenue, with protection only as an incident. During the war
manufacturing became largely developed, partly through our own embargo,
partly through the armed hostilities. Manufacture had grown to be an
extensive interest, comparing in importance with agriculture and
commerce. Therefore, in the new tariff of 1816, the old relation was
reversed, protection being made the main aim and revenue the incident.
It is curious to note that this first protective tariff was championed
and passed by the Republicans and bitterly opposed by the Federalists
and incipient Whigs. Webster argued and inveighed vehemently against it,
appealing to the curse of commercial restriction and of governmental
interference with trade, and to the low character of manufacturing
populations.
But
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