only we must restrict
intellect to the comparing or interlacing of single perceptions.' But
man transcends in his mental powers the barriers of the brute intellect
at a point which coincides with the starting-point of language. And in
this coincidence Professor Mueller endeavors to find a sufficiently
fundamental explanation of the problem of the origin of language.

In reference to this point of coincidence, he quotes Locke as saying
that, 'the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect
distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the
faculties of brutes do by no means attain to,' and then adds:

'If Locke is right in considering the having of general ideas as
the distinguishing feature between man and brutes, and, if we
ourselves are right in pointing to language as the one palpable
distinction between the two, it would seem to follow that language
is the outward sign and realization of that inward faculty which
is called the faculty of abstraction, but which is better known to
us by the homely name of reason.

'Let us now look back to the result of former lectures. It was
this: After we had explained everything in the growth of language
that can be explained, there remained in the end, as the only
inexplicable residuum, what we called _roots_. These roots formed
the constituent elements of all languages.... What, then, are these
roots?'

Two theories have been started to solve this problem: the Onomatopoetic,
according to which roots are imitations of sounds; and the
Interjectional, which regards them as involuntary ejaculations. Having
discussed these theories, and taken the position that, although there
are roots in every language which are respectively imitations of sounds
and involuntary exclamations, it is, nevertheless, impossible to regard
any considerable number of roots, and much less, all roots, as
originating from these sources, the distinguished Philologist announces
as the true theory, that every root 'expresses a general, not an
individual, idea;' just the opposite of what he deems would be the case
if the Onomatopoetic and Interjectional theories explained the origin of
speech.

Some paragraphs are then devoted to the examination of the merits of a
controversy which has existed among philosophers as to

'whether language originated in general appellations, or in proper
names. It is the question