ed to be as undoubted and unquestioned as the product of five
multiplied by five; it cannot be twenty-six nor less than twenty-five.
Consequently the materialistic philosophers consider the criterion of the
senses to be first and foremost.
But in the estimation of the divine philosophers this proof and assurance
is not reliable; nay, rather, they deem the standard of the senses to be
false because it is imperfect. Sight, for instance, is one of the most
important of the senses, yet it is subject to many aberrations and
inaccuracies. The eye sees the mirage as a body of water, regards images
in the mirror as realities when they are but reflections. A man sailing
upon the river imagines that objects upon the shore are moving whereas he
is in motion and they are stationary. To the eye the earth appears fixed
while the sun and stars revolve about it. As a matter of fact the heavenly
orbs are stationary and the earth turning upon its axis. The colossal
suns, planets and constellations which shine in the heavens appear small,
nay, infinitesimal to human vision whereas in reality they are vastly
greater than the earth in dimension and volume. A whirling spark appears
to the sight as a circle of fire. There are numberless instances of this
kind which show the error and inaccuracy of the senses. Therefore the
divine philosophers have considered this standard of judgment to be
defective and unreliable.
The second criterion is that of the intellect. The ancient philosophers in
particular considered the intellect to be the most important agency of
judgment. Among the wise men of Greece, Rome, Persia and Egypt the
criterion of true proof was reason. They held that every matter submitted
to the reasoning faculty could be proved true or false and must be
accepted or rejected accordingly. But in the estimation of the people of
insight this criterion is likewise defective and unreliable, for these
same philosophers who held to reason or intellect as the standard of human
judgment have differed widely among themselves upon every subject of
investigation. The statements of the Greek philosophers are contradictory
to the conclusions of the Persian sages. Even among the Greek philosophers
themselves there is continual variance and lack of agreement upon any
given subject. Great difference of thought also prevailed between the wise
men of Greece and Rome. Therefore if the criterion of reason or intellect
constituted a correct and infallibl
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