, I think, many; some affirmed to be truth and reason, some denied
to be either; and these debates being then in words, proved to be so
loose and perplexed as satisfied neither party. For some time that
which had been affirmed was immediately forgot or denied, and so no
satisfaction given to either party. But that the debate might become
more useful, it was therefore resolved that the day following the
desires and reasons of the Non-conformists should be given in writing,
and they in writing receive answers from the conforming party. And
though I neither now can, nor need to mention all the points debated,
nor the names of the dissenting brethren; yet I am sure Mr. Baxter was
one, and am sure what shall now follow was one of the points debated.

Concerning a command of lawful superiors, what was sufficient to its
being a lawful command; this proposition was brought by the conforming
party.

"That command which commands an act in itself lawful, and no other act
or circumstance unlawful, is not sinful."

Mr. Baxter[26] denied it for two reasons, which he gave in with his
own hand in writing, thus:

One was, "Because that may be a sin _per accidens_, which is not so in
itself, and may be unlawfully commanded, though that accident be
not in the command." Another was, "That it may be commanded under an
unjust penalty."

Again this proposition being brought by the Conformists, "That command
which commandeth an act in itself lawful, and no other act whereby
any unjust penalty is enjoined, nor any circumstance whence, _per
accidens_, any sin is consequent which the commander ought to provide
against, is not sinful."

[Sidenote: His contentions or denials]

Mr. Baxter denied it for this reason, then given in with his own
hand in writing thus: "Because the first act commanded may be _per
accidens_ unlawful, and be commanded by an unjust penalty, though no
other act or circumstance commanded be such."

Again, this proposition being brought by the Conformists, "That
command which commandeth an act in itself lawful, and no other act
whereby any unjust penalty is enjoined, nor any circumstance,
whence directly, or _per accidens_, any sin is consequent, which the
commander ought to provide against, hath in it all things requisite
to the lawfulness of a command, and particularly cannot be guilty of
commanding an act _per accidens_ unlawful, nor of commanding an act
under an unjust penalty."

Mr. Baxter denied it upon the sa