owever, contradicted, and they
say now that Sir H. Fane is going home, and will meet us at Shikarpoor
or Hydrabad, give up the command to Sir J. Keane, and go down the Indus,
and thence to England overland. Which is the true version I know not;
but I am afraid that I have little chance of meeting Colonel Fane, and
giving him Arthur's letter, which I expected to do when I wrote last. I
am delighted at the prospect of our going to Cabool: there we may have
some fighting, and have a chance of being permanently quartered till we
return to Europe, whenever that may be.

What the original cause of all this was, as I told you before, I hardly
know; and you are more likely to get at the true version from some of
the Indian newspapers, or from any friends you may have connected with
this part of the world, than from me. But, as far as I can learn, this
appears to be it: Shah Shooja is the rightful heir to the throne of
Cabool, and Dost Mahomed is what Mr. C. Dickens calls the "wrongful
one," alias the usurper. Dost Mahomed had possession of the country, and
the Indian government, from what motives I know not, determined to
unseat him and replace Shah Shooja. In this matter they are assisted by
old Runjet Sing, King of Lahore, or, as his oriental title goes, "the
blind lion of the Punjab." The Persians, on the contrary, took part with
Dost Mahomed, insulted our resident at their court, and besieged Shah
Shooja's party in Herat; from which, however, after a siege of long
duration, they were finally obliged to retire. There was a report at
first that Russia was concerned in this affair, and that Russian troops
were present with the Persians at the siege, but these turned out to be
a regiment or two of Russian renegadoes whom the King of Persia has in
his pay. There was another report of a letter having been discovered
from the government of Russia to the King of Persia, which induced the
belief that the Emperor of Russia was playing a deep game, the object of
which was to lessen our influence in the East; and many people, I
believe, are very much of this opinion. How far all this may be true I
know not; but I have been told by old Indians that for a long time the
Indian government have been anxious to have a strong footing in Sinde,
and to command the navigation of the Indus; and that now they have the
opportunity they are not likely to let it slip. The Afghans are a very
hardy race of men, and we may have some sharp work with them;