ollowing list of killed, wounded, and missing
tells the story of their valor:
"July 1st the loss was 12 officers and 77 men killed, 32 officers
and 463 men wounded, 58 men missing. Total loss, 642."
The following day the Spaniards resumed the battle, and the losses
of Kent's command on the 2nd and 3d of July made up a total loss
in three days of 99 killed and 597 wounded, and 62 missing. General
Shafter said that before closing his report he desired to dwell upon
"the natural obstacles I had to encounter, and which no foresight could
have overcome or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded no
sheltered landing places, the roads were mere bridle paths, the effect
of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated troops was deadly,
and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the army.
"The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to
prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with
the command had to be depended upon for the victualing of my army,
as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could not in the interests of
humanity be left to starve while we had rations."
During the Chicago Peace Jubilee, General Shafter made an address at
the Armory of the First Illinois Volunteers, and, released from the
continual forms of official reports, added much of interest to the
story of Santiago. He says of the send-off:
"We were twice embarked and twice taken back to Tampa and
disembarked. On the first occasion the cause was the appearance
of Admiral Cervera's fleet; it requiring the entire navy that was
disposable to go after that fleet, and the second time by a report
that afterwards turned out to be incorrect, that in the St. Nicholas
channel, through which we would have to go, some Spanish cruisers
had been seen."
When ordered to Tampa to command the first Cuban expedition,
he continued:
"I took the troops that I thought best fitted and prepared for that
service. There were some magnificent regiments of volunteers, but to
part of them I had issued arms only two or three days before. They
were not properly equipped, and lacked experience. As I had the
choice, I took all of the regulars that were there, and with them
three regiments of volunteers. They were magnificent men, as perfect
as men could be, but, as you know who served in '61, poorly prepared
to take care of themselves at first. You recollect it was months
before we were prepared, and we made num
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