contribute to preserve discipline, and excite courage; and it
is not necessary that a man should be much a soldier to discover, that
discipline and courage united, must generally prevail. To the examples
which he has produced in favour of his opinion, it has been objected,
that victories equally wonderful have been gained with fewer officers,
and, by the honourable gentleman that spoke the second on this occasion,
the actions of Eugene were opposed to those of the duke of MARLBOROUGH.

That victories have been gained by troops differently regulated, I
cannot deny; victories have likewise been gained, sir, under every
circumstance of disadvantage; victories have been gained by inferiour
numbers, and by raw troops, over veteran armies, yet no prudent general
ever produced these instances as arguments against the usefulness of
discipline, or as proofs that superiority of numbers was no advantage.

The success of prince Eugene, in the late war, was far from convincing
the British general, that the German establishment was preferable to our
own; for he required that the Hessian troops, which were paid by
Britain, should be officered like our national troops. In this he could
be influenced only by his own opinion; for he neither nominated their
officers, nor could advance his interest at home by creating new posts
to which he did not recommend; he could, therefore, only regard the
success of the war, and changed their model only because he thought it
defective.

The Germans themselves, sir, are far from imagining that their armies
might not be made more formidable by approaching nearer to the British
methods; for one of their officers, a man of great reputation and
experience, has informed me, that they were convinced of their defect,
and that nothing hindered them from adding more officers, but the fear
of expenses; that they imputed all their defeats to the necessity of
parsimony, that their men wanted not courage but leaders, and that their
enemies gained advantages merely by the superiority of their opulence.

In the late war, it was common for the auxiliary troops, when they were
sent upon any expedition of importance, to be supplied with officers
either from their other regiments, or by the British forces; so
necessary did the duke of MARLBOROUGH think a larger number of officers
in time of action, that where he could not alter the establishment, he
deviated from the common methods of war, and transferred his officers