ce felt to be indefensible. The ingenious Ethelberta, much
more prone than the majority of women to theorize on conduct, felt the
need of some soothing defence of the actions involved in any ambiguous
course before finally committing herself to it.

She took down a well-known treatise on Utilitarianism which she had
perused once before, and to which she had given her adherence ere any
instance had arisen wherein she might wish to take it as a guide. Here
she desultorily searched for argument, and found it; but the application
of her author's philosophy to the marriage question was an operation of
her own, as unjustifiable as it was likely in the circumstances.

'The ultimate end,' she read, 'with reference to and for the sake of
which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our
own good or that of other people) is an existence exempt as far as
possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in
point of quantity and quality. . . . This being, according to the
utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the
standard of morality.'

It was an open question, so far, whether her own happiness should or
should not be preferred to that of others. But that her personal
interests were not to be considered as paramount appeared further on:--

'The happiness which forms the standard of what is right in conduct is
not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between
his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to
be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.'

As to whose happiness was meant by that of 'other people,' 'all
concerned,' and so on, her luminous moralist soon enlightened her:--

'The occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it
in his power to do this on an extended scale--in other words, to be a
public benefactor--are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone
is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case
private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all
he has to attend to.'

And that these few persons should be those endeared to her by every
domestic tie no argument was needed to prove. That their happiness would
be in proportion to her own well-doing, and power to remove their risks
of indigence, required no proving either to her now.

By a sorry but unconscious misapplication o