y and vim--on all subjects during
the war; so these theories, to account for the paralysis after
Manassas, were each in turn discussed, and each found warm defenders.
But gradually it came to be generally conceded that none of them could
be the true one. The President took no command on his visit to
Manassas, for he reached the field only after the battle had been won
and the flight commenced. Any suggestions that occurred to him were
naturally made to General Johnston. There is good authority for stating
that he did not make any criticism on one material point, stating to
both generals that the whole plan, conduct and result of the battle met
his fullest approval; and on reflection the whole people felt that
their chief was too much a soldier to have committed the gross breach
of discipline indicated. The story of the council came to be regarded
as a silly fabrication. The fear of inflaming the North, coming on the
heels of a complete and bloody victory, was about as funny as for a
pugilist whose antagonist's head was "in chancery" to cease striking
lest he should anger him; and events immediately following Manassas
showed there could be little jealousy or pique between the generals, or
between them and the President. General Johnston, with the magnanimity
of the true knight his whole career has shown him to be, declared that
the credit of the plan and choice of the field of battle was due to
General Beauregard; and Mr. Davis' proclamation on the success was
couched in language that breathed only the most honest commendation of
both generals and of their strategy. The fear of invasion prejudicing
opinion abroad was as little believed as the other stories, for--outside
of a small clique--there grew up at this time all over the South such a
perfect confidence in its strength and its perfect ability to work its
own oracle, that very little care was felt for the action of Europe. In
fact, the people were just now quite willing to wait for recognition of
their independence by European powers, until it was already achieved.
So, gradually the public mind settled down to the true reasons that
mainly prevented the _immediate_ following up of the victory.

A battle under all circumstances is a great confusion. With raw troops,
who had never before been under fire, and who had been all day fiercely
contending, until broken and disordered, the confusion must necessarily
have been universal. As they broke, or fell back, brigade over